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 “The terrible situations affecting many states and peoples around the world should be a 
key element that mobilizes the discussions in this forum … it is unfortunate we could not 
see a little more flexibility or humanity in these discussions and make IP a constructive 
tool.”  
Delegate from Ecuador at the WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions, 29 June 2006. 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
International intellectual property (IP) treaties are under constant negotiation. 
Essentially, the debates are about one thing: levels of IP protection. Clear battle-lines have 
emerged: developed states (exporters of patented and copyrighted material) favour 
international treaties which compel states to adopt certain minimum IP protection levels 
in their domestic laws. Developing countries (net importers of protected products) 
require more flexible international IP standards in order to shape their domestic rules to 
suit local circumstances and needs.2  
 In these negotiations, developing countries have based their positions on fundamental 
principles internal to intellectual property law. They have emphasised that protection of 
intellectual property should promote public welfare and the public interest and that it is 
necessary to achieve a balance between the rights of patent and copyright holders and 
the broader social good.  These arguments can be labelled “balance and welfare-
enhancing narratives”.3  
 However, the internal principles of the IP system define neither “public welfare” nor 
“the public interest” and provide no bottom lines with which to assess whether the 
balance struck between the public good and the private rights of patent and copyright 
                                                   
1 “Blogging WIPO: Development Agenda blocked” (June 29, 2006). Available at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation web page at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archive/2006/06 (last visited August 2010). 
2 For a general overview of the history of such negotiations see Peter Drahos “Developing countries and 
international intellectual property standard-setting” (2002) 5 Journal of World Intellectual Property 765. 
3 Cf Ruth Okediji “Narratives of developing country participation in the global intellectual property 
system” (2003) 7 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 315. 




holders is reasonable or legally acceptable. Repeated reliance on these principles has 
exposed the inherent weaknesses of internal “balance and welfare-enhancing 
arguments” – developed states can rely on the same internal balance and welfare-
enhancing principles to promote very different agendas.4  
 Outside of WIPO, United Nations human rights experts have used binding human rights 
documents, particularly the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),5 to develop clear benchmarks against which the human rights impact of 
intellectual property rules may be measured.6 These benchmarks could also be used to 
measure the extent to which intellectual property rules promote the public good and 
actually achieve a balance between the rights of patent holders and the broader public 
interest.   
 Recently, developing countries have celebrated the adoption of the 2007 WIPO 
Development Agenda as a “paradigm shift” in international IP negotiation.7 But the 
Development Agenda contains no clear additional benchmarks to direct future discussion 
beyond the impasse evident in previous talks. This article suggests that developing 
country negotiators should use human rights standards and benchmarks to move the 
Development Agenda forward and ensure a more meaningful “paradigm shift” in 
international IP negotiation.  
 To illustrate the weakness of internal arguments and the potential value of human 
rights benchmarks, the article examines aspects of international norm-setting and 
negotiation as played out in previous IP negotiations: first at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Doha Ministerial Meetings on TRIPS8 and Public Health in 2001 and 
2003, and then at the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) during the WIPO 
Development Agenda discussions from 2005 to 2007. It also examines the shortcomings 
of the new WIPO Development Agenda and argues that a focus on human rights 
obligations could improve and give clearer direction to “development-orientated norm-
setting” in future.  To illustrate this discussion, the paper focuses on patents and essential 
medicines. 
 
                                                   
4 This is explored in the discussion below.  
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1967) 6 ILM 360. 
6 See particularly United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General 
comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12) (UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4) 
and the reports of UN Special Rapporteur  Paul Hunt The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health: report of the Special Rapporteur  (UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (2004), UN Special Rapporteur Anand Grover The right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: report of the Special Rapporteur 
(A/HRC/11/12 (2009)) and UN High Commissioner Simon Walker The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, ECOSOC  
(Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd 
Session, Provisional Agenda item 4. UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) (27 July 2001). 
7 Statement by Egypt on behalf of the Development Action Group, presented at the 5th Session of the CDIP, 
26-30 April, 2010. 
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, adopted Dec 15 1993 (1994) 33 ILM  81. Doha is the capital city of Qatar. 
 




2 THE DOHA DISCUSSIONS: THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNAL ARGUMENTS 
The Doha Ministerial Meetings of the WTO in 2001 and 2003 provide an excellent 
illustration of the use of “internal arguments” and the difficulties inherent in this 
approach. The central controversy at Doha was compulsory licensing, and particularly 
the legality of exporting generic drugs manufactured under such licences.  At the Doha 
Meetings developing countries presented an internal “balance and welfare-enhancing” 
argument based on public health interests. 
 
2.1 Background to the discussions 
The patent system is based on monopolies giving the patent holder exclusive rights to 
manufacture patented products, use patented processes or license others to do so.9 
Because patent monopolies exclude market competition, patented products can be sold at 
supra-competitive prices.10 In general, states do not favour monopolies that result in 
uncompetitive pricing practices but, historically, governments have sanctioned patent 
monopolies on the grounds that they encourage development of “important inventions” 
which benefit society.11  Indeed, this remains the core justification for patent monopolies, 
and “there is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to 
promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention”.12 
 One obvious social cost of patent monopolies is that some people are unable to pay 
monopoly prices.13 It has been long recognised that the expected public benefits of 
innovation will be undermined if patent monopolies result in excessive pricing, making 
new products unaffordable.14 Thus another foundational premise of the patent system is 
the need for an appropriate balance between patent monopolies given as incentives to 
innovators and the ability of the public to use and benefit from new inventions.15 
                                                   
9 David Bainbridge Intellectual property 4 ed Pearson Education (1999) at 317. 
10 Daniel Gifford “How do the social benefits and costs of the patent system stack up in pharmaceuticals?” 
(2004) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 75 at 102. 
11 Robert Merges & Jane Ginsburg Foundations of intellectual property Foundation Press (2004) at 21; 
Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently Making of modern intellectual property law Cambridge University Press 
(1999) at 129-134. See also Drahos Death of patents Lawtext Publishing and Queen Mary Intellectual 
Property Research Institute (2005) at 1-2 discussing this and other historical policy objectives. 
12 Dan L Burk & Mark Lemley “Policy levers in patent law” (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 1575 at 1580; 
WR Cornish Intellectual property: patents, copyrights, trade marks and allied rights 4 ed Sweet & Maxwell 
(1999) at 129. Barton argues that “[a] patent monopoly is justified only if the monopoly is likely to lead to 
genuine incentives for research and for bringing new products to market”: see John Barton “Issues posed 
by a world patent system” in Maskus & Reichman (eds) International public goods and transfer of 
technology under a globalized intellectual property regime Cambridge University Press (2005) 617 at 623. 
13 Merges & Nelson describe this as the “underuse of the invention due to patent monopolies”. See Robert 
Merges & Richard Nelson “On the complex economics of patent scope” (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 
839 at 868. See also William Landes & Richard Posner The economic structure of intellectual property law 
Harvard University Press (2003) at 310. 
14 See the historical overview by Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose “The patent controversy in the nineteenth 
century” (1950) 10 Journal of Economic History 1-29. 
15 Burk & Lemley (fn 12 above) at 1575; Louis Kaplow “The patent-antitrust intersection: a reappraisal” 
(1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 1813 at 1834. See also Kenneth Arrow “Economic welfare and the 




“Balance and welfare-enhancing” arguments rely on these foundational principles and 
hold intellectual property law to its own premises and legitimising justifications. 
 In principle, because patent monopolies are government grants, governments can 
decide when to award them and the terms on which they are awarded.16 Government 
might decide that the social costs of monopoly protection are unacceptable in certain 
situations and might therefore exclude certain products or process from the patent 
system. Governments can also limit the scope of patent protection.  No patent is absolute 
and all states make some provision for compulsory licensing.17 Compulsory licences 
permit government agencies (or private companies authorised by the government) to 
manufacture generic equivalents of patented products without the consent of the patent-
holder.18 
 The TRIPS Agreement was designed to strengthen international protection of 
intellectual property by raising compulsory local protection levels and thus restricting 
states’ domestic IP policy options.19 A good example is the protection required for 
pharmaceuticals. Before TRIPS, states had the policy freedom to decide what to patent 
and on what terms. Many states excluded pharmaceuticals from patent protection on the 
ground that it was not in the public interest to increase the price of medicines through 
patent monopolies.20 Many states protected only processes, making it permissible to 
produce generic equivalents of patented products (including pharmaceuticals) by reverse 
engineering.21 India’s extensive generic manufacturing industry was based on this kind 
of patent system.22  
 Restricting this policy freedom was a primary objective for developed states during the 
TRIPS negotiations. They complained that the global standards at that time were 
“inadequate” and proposed raising the minimum protection standards required in all 
                                                                                                                                                              
allocation of resources for invention” in Rosenberg (ed) The economics of technological change Penguin 
(1971) at 172-173. 
16 Bainbridge (fn 9 above) at 324. 
17 World Health Organization. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
Public health, innovation, and intellectual property rights: report of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health World Health Organization (2006). Available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/en/ (last visited August 2010)  at 54-
55; UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource book on TRIPS and development Cambridge University Press (2005) at 468; 
Developing Country Group’s paper submitted at the WTO Ministerial Meeting on TRIPS and Public Health 
(29 June 2001) IP/C/W/296 para 29. 
18 Carlos Correa “Patent rights’ provisions” in Correa & Yusuf (eds) Intellectual property and international 
trade: the TRIPS Agreement. 2 ed Wolters-Kluwer (2008) 227 at 245; UNCTAD-ICTSD (fn 17 above) at 
461; Bainbridge (fn 9 above) at 392ff. 
19 See generally the discussions in Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns 
the knowledge economy? Earthscan (2002); Susan Sell Private power, public law: the globalization of 
intellectual property rights  Cambridge University Press (2003) and Keith Maskus & Jerome H Reichman 
(eds) International public goods and transfer of technology under a globalized intellectual property regime 
Cambridge University Press (2005). 
20 A 1988 WIPO study of the Paris Convention members found that 49 of the 98 members did not grant 
pharmaceutical patents. See Drahos (fn 11 above) at 3. 
21 Drahos & Braithwaite (fn 19 above) at 59.  
22 Srividhya Ragavan “Of the inequals of the Uruguay Round” (2006) 10 Marquette Intellectual Property 
Law Review 273 at 289-290; Drahos (fn 2 above) at 768. 
 




states’ domestic IP systems.23 TRIPS now obliges member states to provide patent 
protection for almost all inventions, including medicines,24 and mandates patent 
protection for products as well as processes.25  
 TRIPS also restricts the circumstances under which states can issue compulsory 
licences for patented products. TRIPS Article 31 does provide for compulsory licensing 
(and is therefore classified as a “flexibility clause”)26 but Article 31 requirements are very 
complicated, cumbersome and circumscribed, permitting far less domestic flexibility than 
was possible before TRIPS.  Article 31(f) particularly impeded the availability of generic 
medicines,27 providing that compulsory licences should be “authorized predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use”.28 Most 
developing states do not have the infrastructure to manufacture generic drugs for 
themselves.29 Article 31(f) placed severe limitations on their ability to import generic 
drugs because states could import only from countries that manufactured such drugs 
primarily for their domestic markets.  
 By the time the Doha talks began in 2001, the international patent system had made it 
increasingly difficult for states to control availability of affordable essential medicines 
required to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. At that time on-patent prices of 
antiretroviral treatment ranged from US$10 000 to US$15 000 per patient per year.30 
Generic equivalents cost a fraction of the price – Indian generics manufacturer Cipla, for 
example, could offer treatment packages for a mere US$350 per year.31  In this context 
the patents on antiretroviral drugs created a publicity disaster for patent-holding 
companies. The headlines were emphatic: “Patent Greed” in London’s Daily Telegraph;32 
“Protection Racket” in the New Scientist;33 “The Profits that Kill” in New African.34 One 
response by patent holders was to offer heavily discounted drugs to poor countries.35 
                                                   
23 See United States proposal at the GATT meeting: Suggestion by the United States for achieving the 
negotiating objective MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14 October 1987 at 3, and the sources cited in fn 19 above. 
24 TRIPS Art 27(1); Jayashree Watal Intellectual property rights in the WTO and developing countries 
Kluwer Law International (2001) at 4. 
25 Art 27(1). 
26 TRIPS is largely a protectionist treaty. Clauses which limit owners’ rights are thus “exceptions” to the 
broad rights given to patent holders. 
27 As originally worded. See the discussion on “Paragraph 6 Agreement” below. 
28 TRIPS Article 31(f).  
29 Amit Gupta “Patent rights on pharmaceutical products and affordable drugs: can TRIPS provide a 
solution?” (2004) 2 Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal 127 at 138. 
30 Médecins sans Frontières Untangling the web of price reductions: a pricing guide for the purchase of 
ARVs for developing countries 11 ed Médecins sans Frontières (2008) at 6, noting the lowest-available on-
patent price (for standard first-line triple therapy) of US$10 439 per year in January 2000. 
31 Prices quoted by Mac Margolis et al “An AIDS-drug price war” Newsweek 19 February 2001. 
32 Helen Brown “Patent greed” Daily Telegraph 21 April 2001. 
33 Debora MacKenzie “Protection racket” New Scientist 21 July 2001. 
34 Osei Boateng “The profits that kill” (2001) 22 New African 30 April 2001. 
35 Mark Heywood “Drug access, patents and global health: ‘chaffed and waxed sufficient’” (2002) 23 Third 
World Quarterly 217 at 227. See also the price tables published in annual volumes of Médecins sans 
Frontières Untangling the web (fn 30 above). 




 Developing states, however, have found it extremely difficult to plan their public health 
programmes around pharmaceutical companies’ discount schemes. The schemes 
depend largely on business decisions of patent-holding companies and are far from 
guaranteed: states cannot rely on either sources or prices and have very little control 
over which medicines are discounted, for how long or in what volume.36 Not all on-
patent drugs are included in the schemes, and this reduces states’ public health options 
for providing the most appropriate medicines.37 Some of the most effective and most 
easily dispensed fixed-dose combinations are manufactured only by generics-
producers.38 These factors impede planning and development of HIV/AIDS programmes.  
 Developing states need more control over the supply of essential medicines. They 
want the IP policy space to manufacture or import generic drugs.39 This would enable 
them to plan and execute their public health programmes more effectively. This would 
furthermore give them a reliable and predictable source of medicines, a wider choice of 
drugs and suppliers, and the ability to enter into long-term contracts.40 Developing states 
are also concerned that discount schemes might be curtailed or abandoned if generic 
competition is eliminated.41  
 
2.2 Internal arguments at Doha 
The Doha discussions on TRIPS and Public Health were initiated by the African Group 
early in 2001. Those states, together with other developing countries, were concerned 
about the effects of TRIPS on access to essential medicines, particularly those needed to 
                                                   
36 United Kingdom, Department for International Development Increasing people’s access to essential 
medicines in developing countries: a framework for good practice in the pharmaceutical industry DFID 
(2005) at 32. 
37 See the drugs tables in Médecins sans Frontières (fn 30 above). 
38 See, for example, the drugs tables in Médecins sans Frontières (fn 30 above). 
39 WTO.TRIPS Council. Minutes of special discussion on intellectual property and access to medicines, June 
18-22, 2001 [IP/C/M/31] Brazilian Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 11; Argentinian Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 
13. 
40 See the discussion of these and other benefits of compulsory licensing in Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy: Report of the Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights United Kingdom. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002). 
Available at http://www.iprcommission.org (last visited August 2010) at 42-45. 
41 One of the strongest arguments for compulsory licensing is the effect that this has on the price of 
brand-name drugs. Differential pricing schemes instituted by the originator companies are partly a 
response to competition in the market-place, and it is unlikely that prices would have dropped as 
significantly without generic competition (Wesley Cann “On the relationship between intellectual 
property rights and the need of less-developed countries for access to pharmaceuticals: creating a legal 
duty to supply under a theory of progressive global constitutionalism” (2004) 25 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 755 at 804; CIPR (fn 40 above) at 35).  See Landes & 
Posner (fn 13 above) at 313-314 for discussion on the effect of generic competition on originator prices. A 
predictable market also favours generics producers, since they are able to forecast probable sales and can 
feel reasonably confident about their production investments (World Health Organization “Access to 
medicines” (2005) 19 WHO Drug Information 236 at 238; Jayashree Watal “Background note for the 
Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs”. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wto_background_e.doc (last visited August 2010) at 6). 
 




combat HIV/AIDS.42 This initiative was partly a response to attempts by the United States 
and pharmaceutical companies to thwart TRIPS-compliant measures (authorising 
production of generics) instituted by South Africa and Brazil.43 Legal action against Brazil 
and South Africa was suspended following political pressure, but developing countries’ 
policy freedom to use TRIPS flexibility articles44 remained uncertain and insecure.45 The 
Developing Country Group46 thus sought both greater clarity and an express agreement 
by WTO members that TRIPS “flexibilities” (such as Article 31) allow states to fashion 
their patent laws in ways that enable them to meet their public health objectives.47  
 Much of the Developing Country Group’s Doha submission paper merely sought 
confirmation that TRIPS permits compulsory licensing and the parallel import of generic 
drugs when the listed requirements are fulfilled.  However, the Group also highlighted the 
difficulties that Article 31 presented for states wishing to import generic medicines and 
called on the TRIPS Council to confirm that Article 31(f) did not prevent members from 
granting compulsory licences to supply foreign markets.48 Clearly, this was precisely 
what Article 31(f) was designed to curtail, and this submission effectively called for an 
amendment to the TRIPS treaty.  
 To a large extent the developing countries’ arguments relied on TRIPS Article 7. This 
article had been inserted into TRIPS at their insistence (and is often regarded as one of 
the few “victories” for developing countries during the TRIPS negotiations).49 Article 7 is 
                                                   
42 Davinia Ovett “Making trade policies more accountable and human-rights consistent: a NGO 
perspective of using human rights instruments in the case of access to medicines” in Benedek, de Feyter & 
Marrella (eds) Economic globalisation and human rights Cambridge University Press (2007) 170 at 176; 
Carlos Correa “Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” Health 
Economics and Drugs EMD Series no 12 World Health Organization (2002) Available at www.who.int (last 
visited August 2010) at 1; Lawrence Helfer “Regime shifting: the TRIPS Agreement and new dynamics of 
international intellectual property law making” (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1 at 66; Brook 
Baker “Arthritic flexibilities for accessing medicines: analysis of WTO action regarding paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (2004) 14 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 613 at 624-25. 
43 The United States brought a complaint against Brazil’s Patent Act Law 9.279/96 (See “Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the United States” WT/DS199/3 9 January 2001), and passed Public Law 105-
277 (1999), which threatened to suspend American aid to South Africa pending negotiations leading to 
the repeal of s 15(c) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 
1997. Pharmaceutical companies sued the South African Government (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa and Another: In re ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
1999 (4) SA 788 (T); 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC)); see South African Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 27; James 
Harrison The human rights impact of the World Trade Organisation Hart (2007) at 159-160. 
44 For example, Article 31 permitting compulsory licensing. 
45 Susan Sell “TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign” (2002) 20 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 481 at 492. 
46 A coalition of 80 developing countries led by the African group, India, and Brazil, and supported by an 
international coalition of NGOs including Médecins sans Frontières, Oxfam, and the Treatment Action 
Campaign. See Ovett (fn 42 above) at 176.  
47 See for example Developing Country Group’s paper submitted at the WTO Ministerial Meeting on TRIPS 
and Public Health (29 June 2001) IP/C/W/296 para 5, and paras 17-23. 
48 Developing Country Group’s paper IP/C/W/296 para 34. 
49 See Note of the Secretariat Meeting of Negotiating Group 12-14 July 1989 MTN.GNG/NG11/14, 12 
September 1989 for minutes of the discussions. For comment on the significance of Article 7 for 
developing countries see Watal (fn 24 above) and Drahos & Braithwaite (fn 19 above). 




a formulation of the “balance and welfare-enhancing” principles which are universally 
recognised as foundational premises of the IP system, and sets out the objectives of the 
treaty as follows: 
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.”50  
During the TRIPS negotiations, developed countries resisted insertion of this paragraph51 
and the final wording agreed upon is somewhat vague and non-specific. Furthermore, 
Article 7 uses the permissive verb “should” rather than the peremptory “shall” used in 
most TRIPS articles. At the time, developed state negotiators were reported as saying that 
Article 7 had no “operational significance” and was merely hortatory.52 Developing state 
negotiators, however, believed that future use and interpretation of Article 7 could be 
“one means of ‘clawing’ back much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in TRIPS”.53  
 This is what the Developing Country Group tried to do at Doha. The Group pointed out 
that Article 7 “clearly establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights do not exist in a vacuum. They are supposed to benefit society as a whole 
and do not aim at the mere protection of private rights.”54 In the context of health 
pandemics, patent rights should be exercised in a way that achieves a balance between 
the rights of patent holders and the needs of users of patented medicines “in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of rights and obligations”.55  
 The Group argued that the Article 31 compulsory licensing provisions should be 
interpreted in light of Article 7.56 Article 31(f) made it extremely difficult for developing 
countries to acquire the generic drugs needed to respond to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
with the effect that the private rights of patent holders were protected at the expense of 
public health and social welfare more generally. Developing countries submitted that 
Article 31(f) must be interpreted “flexibly and broadly” when applied to essential 
medicines required by developing countries.57  This would ensure that TRIPS did not 
“hamper people's access to affordable medicines, [or] stand in the way of 
urgently-needed solutions to the deepening health crisis”.58 
 The developing countries’ Doha proposal is a typical balance and welfare-enhancing 
argument based on internal principles of the IP system. The weakness of this argument 
was that developed states could easily use the same internal principles against the 
developing states. Developed states did not dispute the public benefit objectives of the 
                                                   
50 TRIPS Article 7. 
51 See UNCTAD-ICTSD (fn 17 above) at 120. 
52 Watal (fn 24 above) at 293 fn 5. 
53 Ibid at 7. 
54 Developing Country Group’s paper IP/C/W/296 para 18. 
55 Ibid at para 19, quoting TRIPS Article 7. 
56 Ibid at paras 18-21 and 28-34. 
57 Indian Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 24. 
58 Zimbabwean Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 4. 
 




patent system. They agreed that this was precisely what the system was designed to 
achieve – development of useful new technologies like pharmaceuticals that promote 
public health.59 They argued, however, that high protection levels are essential to ensure 
that the system fulfils this objective.60 Pharmaceuticals require years of research and 
development (R&D) and enormous financial investment. Testing and regulation 
requirements add significantly to the cost.  According to some estimates, it can cost as 
much as US$ 800 million to bring a new drug to market.61 Drug companies argue that in 
order to recoup their R&D investment they require patent monopoly income well in 
excess of the simple manufacturing costs of pharmaceuticals and that patent monopoly 
prices accurately reflect the true cost of producing the drugs.62 Developed countries thus 
argued that patents “provide an essential stimulus for creativity and innovation.  These 
rights need to be adequately protected in order to encourage investment in research and 
development into new medicines”.63  
 When developing states pointed out that TRIPS requires protection of intellectual 
property rights to contribute to social welfare64 and provides that member states may 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health,65 developed states countered that 
intellectual property protection itself promotes public health and social welfare 
objectives by encouraging development of useful new medicines, and is indeed essential 
to this end.  Without the drug companies’ considerable investment in research and 
development, new medicines would not be developed, and there would be no drugs for 
the generics manufacturers to copy.66 In response it was argued that developing country 
markets do not form part of the drug companies’ investment incentive. Pharmaceutical 
companies cannot reasonably expect to recoup their R&D costs through sale of their 
products in developing countries: Africa comprises only 1.2 percent of the global market, 
India 1.3 percent and the rest of Asia 2.6 percent.67 Loss or reduction of these markets to 
generic competitors would have negligible effects on global originator drug profits.68  
 It has also been argued that originator companies do not need to sell their products at 
the full on-patent price in all markets. Drug companies could maintain their overall profit 
                                                   
59 American Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 33. 
60 Ibid at 35. 
61 Christopher Holman “Do reverse payment settlements violate the antitrust law?” (2007) 23 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Technology Law Journal 489 at 509. However, some studies dispute the drug companies’ 
claims and estimate that figures are more “in the range of US$50 – 100 million for each newly developed 
drug”: Adila Hassim, Mark Heywood, Jonathan Berger Health & democracy: a guide to human rights, health 
law and policy in post-apartheid South Africa  SiberInk (2007) at 439. 
62 Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse “Theory and implementation of differential pricing for 
pharmaceuticals” in Maskus & Reichman (eds) International public goods and transfer of technology under 
a globalized intellectual property regime Cambridge University Press (2005) 425 at 428; see also CIPR (fn 
40 above) at 29. 
63 EC Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 7.  
64 TRIPS Art 7. 
65 TRIPS Art 8(1). 
66 American Delegation IP/C/M/31 at 33; Cann (fn 41 above) at 794. 
67 DFID (fn 36 above) at 323; WHO (fn 41 above) at 236. 
68 Caroline Thomas “Trade policy and the politics of access to drugs” (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 251 
at 254. 




margins (and possibly increase them) by selling more drugs to more people using 
differential pricing models:69 that is, selling drugs at on-patent prices in developed-
country markets70 while selling them at prices closer to production cost in the developing 
world. According to economists, differential pricing always tends to be more profitable 
than selling commodities at the same price in all markets.71 With pharmaceuticals, such 
models allow companies to recoup their investment, and indeed maximise their profits, 
while still ensuring that the right to health of the poor is not endangered.72  
 Developing countries were always willing to pay licence fees under compulsory 
licensing schemes. Their proposals posed no financial prejudice to the drug companies 
and in no way undermined the ability of the patent system to incentivise pharmaceutical 
research and development.  Despite this, developed countries insisted that patent rights 
need to be strong and that weakening these rights by facilitating compulsory licensing 
would not be in the long-term public interest; strong rights were essential for the 
development of new drugs from which everyone would benefit eventually.73 
 Although these arguments continued for three years, the Article 31(f) problem was 
never satisfactorily resolved. The deadline for acceptance of the temporary (and 
unsatisfactory)74 “Paragraph 6”75 solution to Article 31(f) has now been extended to 
December 201176 and the compulsory licensing issue is once again under negotiation.77 
                                                   
69 See Watal (fn 41 above) at 11. 
70 In practice, many pharmaceutical companies use differential pricing within developed-country markets 
too, with the result that not all developed-state consumers pay the full on-patent price. See Arti Rai “The 
information revolution reaches pharmaceuticals: balancing innovation incentives, cost, and access in the 
post-genomics era” 2001 University Illinois Law Review 173 at 188 for discussion of differential pricing 
practices in the United States and Carsten Fink “International price discrimination and market 
segmentation for patented pharmaceuticals in the EU: a social welfare analysis” in Govaere & Ullrich (eds) 
Intellectual property, public policy and international trade Peter Lang (2007) 169 for discussion on 
differential pricing in Europe. 
71 CIPR (fn 40 above) at 35; Watal (fn 41 above) at 12. See also DFID (fn 36 above) at 32;  Gifford  (fn 10 
above) at 115-116, discussing price discrimination in the global market as a way of minimising 
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Round’s public health legacy: strategies for the production and diffusion of patented medicines under the 
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There is little reason to hope that the problem will be settled during current talks unless 
something new is brought into the discussion.  Negotiations over patents and public 
health are impossible to finalise using only internal principles of intellectual property law 
because the debate straddles the tension inherent in the patent system – benefits of 
patent monopolies versus consequent social costs. Intellectual property law does not tell 
us when the social costs of the system become legally unacceptable.   
 States need, in addition, to use an “external” argument and look for norms outside of 
intellectual property law and principles to resolve this impasse. The human rights system 
provides clear standards and benchmarks which give legal content to the term “public 
benefit” and demarcate a bottom line below which the social costs of the international 
patent system become non-negotiable and potentially unlawful. 
 
3 ESTABLISHING HUMAN RIGHTS BENCHMARKS: ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 
Rules protecting the rights of patent holders are usually highly specific and have very 
effective enforcement machinery.78 In comparison, the human rights set out in treaties 
like the ICESCR seem vague, indeterminate, non-specific and unenforceable.79 It would be 
difficult to use ICESCR rights to counter rights set out in TRIPS and other IP treaties 
unless human rights were perceived as similarly precise obligations.  
 Until recently, social and economic rights were generally considered to be 
“jurisprudentially undeveloped”80 and their normative content to be “obscure”.81 The 
ICESCR itself has been perceived as having little practical significance, its wording as 
vague and non-specific and the scope and content of the obligations not clearly spelled 
out.82 Some have argued that ICESCR rights could not function as peremptory norms 
because they “do not provide the guidance that a rule of law should provide”.83  
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 Furthermore, all ICESCR rights are subject to “progressive realization”. Article 2(1) of 
the Convention calls for each state party to 
“take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”  
Historically, this reference to progressive realisation created a perception that the 
ICESCR does not create binding obligations in the same way as ICCPR84 rights (which are 
not subject to progressive realisation), especially as the ICESCR gives little guidance on 
what “achieving progressively” means or how progress should be measured.85 
 During the past two decades, however, human rights scholars have enriched 
jurisprudential understanding of the ICESCR86 by specifying the rights’ core content, 
clarifying obligations, identifying specific violations, and generally raising the profile and 
legitimacy of social and economic rights.87 This “reclaiming” of social and economic rights 
has made it clear that the rights protected by the ICESCR are not fundamentally different 
from those protected by the ICCPR.  It is now “generally accepted that rights in both 
categories are essentially similar”88 and that “there is no sharp conceptual distinction 
between the two categories”.89 
 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
been particularly important in this jurisprudential development.90 The CESCR, as the 
supervisory body for the ICESCR,91 from time to time, issues “General Comments” aimed 
at “clarify[ing] the normative issues [of the ICESCR] ....”92 These General Comments, 
though not legally binding in their own right, are “authoritative interpretations” of the 
binding clauses in the ICESCR intended as firm guidelines for practical implementation.93 
States parties that fail to act on the Committee’s recommendations “show bad faith in 
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implementing their Covenant-based obligations”,94 a contravention of Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).95 
 The CESCR has examined many of the ICESCR rights in detail.96 It has established clear 
benchmarks and has identified specific conduct that will be regarded as violating ICESCR 
obligations. This jurisprudential development has enormous advantages for those who 
want to rely on human rights to counter the very precise and specific protectionist rules 
in the IP treaties.97 
 One of the jurisprudential tools used by the CESCR is the “tripartite typology” which 
shows that all human rights give rise to duties to “respect”, “protect” and “fulfil” the 
rights. The duty of respect requires states to refrain from any action which would 
interfere with a particular right: “[t]he broad idea is not to worsen an individual’s 
situation by depriving that person of the enjoyment of a declared right”.98 The obligation 
to protect requires states to “prevent violations of such rights by third parties”.99 The 
obligation to fulfil requires states “to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial and other measures toward the full realization of such rights”.100   
 Another useful tool is the identification of the “minimum core” of the ICESCR rights. 
Minimum core rights are non-derogable in principle101 and states must take immediate 
steps towards their implementation.102 The minimum core concept is extremely useful 
for policy-setting and bench-marking and could be a powerful tool in international 
negotiation.103 
 The CESCR has also explained that progressive realization   
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“should not be interpreted as removing all meaningful content from States parties’ 
obligations. Rather, it means that States parties have a specific and continuing obligation 
to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of [the 
rights].”104  
States have immediate obligations to “take steps” toward the full realization of the 
ICESCR rights.105 Examples of such steps include legislation aimed at achieving a right106  
or the development and implementation of “targeted, legally consistent, and sufficiently 
progressive policies” aimed at the full realisation of economic and social rights.107  
 In the context of international IP negotiation, one of the best developed rights is the 
right to essential medicines based on the ICESCR right to health (Article 12) as examined 
by the CESCR in its General Comment 14:  The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health.108 The Committee identifies provision of “essential medicines” as part of the 
“minimum core” of the right to health.109 “Essential medicines” are defined as those 
listed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in terms of its Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs.110 The WHO list does not include the latest groundbreaking therapies; it 
is mostly restricted to older, patent-free and affordable basic medicines.111 However, 
because antiretroviral drugs are the only realistic way to control the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic,112 the WHO added several antiretrovirals to the essential medicines list even 
though most were still under patent and very expensive when they were first included.  
In this regard, the Organisation has encouraged and assisted states to use TRIPS 
flexibilities (like Article 31) to enable them to procure essential medication at lower 
prices.113  
 The WHO advises states to adopt pharmaceutical policies designed to make essential 
medicines more affordable, especially where the listed medicines are still under 
patent.114 These pharmaceutical policies should include policies on generics, pricing 
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policies, bulk procurement policies, differential pricing structures, compulsory licensing, 
parallel importation, price negotiation with drug companies and other strategies 
designed to ensure that prices of essential drugs are kept as low as possible.115 
 The CESCR identifies the adoption and implementation of national public health 
strategies and action plans as minimum core obligations.116 These health strategies 
should include pharmaceutical strategies. Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt confirms that 
“the State has to do all it reasonably can do to make an essential medicine available in its 
jurisdiction, e.g. by using, where appropriate, TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory 
licences and parallel imports”.117 Pharmaceutical policies must be aimed at acquiring 
essential medicines from reliable suppliers at the lowest possible prices, thus ensuring 
that essential drugs are available and affordable, particularly to the poor.118 
 States’ non-derogable minimum core obligation to provide essential medicines is 
perhaps best understood by considering the obligation to provide medicines119 together 
with the obligation to adopt pharmaceutical strategies:120 A state’s available resources 
may make it impossible to purchase and distribute HIV/AIDS drugs to all residents 
immediately, but it must make the best effort possible within available resources, 
including efforts to obtain essential medicines at affordable prices. Most importantly, 
states have immediate and non-derogable duties to establish appropriate pharmaceutical 
programmes and policies. In the context of essential medicines, pharmaceutical 
strategies and policies are crucial steps towards making antiretroviral medicines 
available, and the ability to issue compulsory licences is a key component of the strategy. 
Not only does this enable states to procure cheaper drugs directly from generics 
manufactures; it also enables them to negotiate better prices with originator 
companies.121 States must ensure that they retain sufficient patent policy flexibility so 
that they can establish suitable pharmaceutical policies, and thereby meet these 
immediate and non-derogable core obligations.  
 The CESCR has also examined ICESCR states’ obligations to people in foreign 
countries. Member states have extraterritorial obligations “to respect the enjoyment of 
the right to health in other countries”.122 States’ international IP and trade policies violate 
this obligation of respect if they make it more difficult for people in foreign countries to 
acquire essential medicines (for example by making it harder for other states to adopt 
appropriate pharmaceutical policies).123 Thus, ICESCR members should ensure that 
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international agreements and instruments do not have a negative impact on the right to 
health in other countries.124 This applies also to states parties’ actions as members of 
international organisations: ICESCR members have a duty to ensure that the actions of 
these organisations respect the right to health in all parts of the world.125 
 The CESCR has also examined the human rights implications of “the public interest”. 
The Committee has emphasised that state public welfare policies must be non-
discriminatory and should focus particularly on the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population. In the context of the right to health, for example, states have a particular duty 
to provide health care to the poor, and equality of access to health care is listed as part of 
the minimum core of the right.126 Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt points out that non-
discrimination and equality of access imply “a particular preoccupation with those who 
are disadvantaged, vulnerable and living in poverty”.127  
 
4 USING HUMAN RIGHTS BENCHMARKS 
At Doha, the Developing Country Group demanded confirmation that TRIPS flexibilities 
allowed them to establish national health care and pharmaceutical programmes to 
respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis and to procure generic drugs from reliable sources of 
their choice. They based these demands on their public health care needs and on TRIPS 
Article 7. What they did not do, however, was link these demands to the obligations 
arising from the ICESCR.  General Comment 14 offered them clear benchmarks; as noted 
above, it insists that ICESCR member states have binding minimum core obligations to 
establish pharmaceutical policies that enable them to procure essential medicines at the 
lowest possible prices128 and to respect the right to health in foreign countries by not 
adopting or interpreting treaties in ways which make it more difficult for governments to 
establish pharmaceutical policies that promote availability of essential drugs.129 The 
failure to examine human rights obligations during the Doha talks may seem particularly 
surprising because almost all WTO and members are also ICESCR states parties.130 
 Human rights scholars have used General comment 14 in various ways to examine the 
right to essential medicines. The strongest form of the argument demonstrates a 
potential conflict between ICESCR obligations and TRIPS obligations and argues that 
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ICESCR member states must reconcile this conflict by interpreting TRIPS in a human 
rights-compliant manner.131  
 This argument begins with the observation that states which have ratified human 
rights treaties violate their commitments if they enter into other agreements which are 
incompatible with their existing human rights obligations.132 The specification of ICESCR 
obligations by the CESCR appears to demonstrate a potential conflict between states’ 
treaty obligations under and TRIPS and the ICESCR.133 For example, limitations on the 
export of generic drugs imposed by TRIPS Article 31(f) would appear to conflict with 
states’ duties to maintain enough IP policy space to establish appropriate pharmaceutical 
policies or to respect the right to health in foreign states.134   
 States have a duty to uphold all their treaty commitments in terms of Article 26 of the 
VCLT.135 In order to avoid conflict between their various treaty commitments, states are 
obliged to interpret the treaties that bind them in ways that avoid conflict and allow 
them to fulfil all their obligations.136  
 The CESCR has made it clear that ICESCR member states have certain non-derogable 
minimum-core obligations under that treaty.  The challenge for these states is to interpret 
and implement their TRIPS commitments in a human rights-compliant manner which 
does not conflict with their ICESCR obligations.137 It is possible for ICESCR states to abide 
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by all their treaty commitments in terms of both ICESCR and TRIPS provided that full use 
is made of TRIPS flexibilities and TRIPS exception clauses are interpreted in a way which 
is human rights-compliant.138   
 In terms of the strong version of the human rights argument, all ICESCR member 
states at Doha should have insisted that Article 31(b) be interpreted “flexibly and 
broadly”,139 not only because of the general “balance and welfare-enhancing” objectives 
of the TRIPS treaty set out in Article 7 but also because their ICESCR commitments 
mandate an interpretation giving states enough patent policy flexibility to establish the 
necessary pharmaceutical policies.140 
 Reliance on ICESCR obligations during negotiation has certain strategic advantages for 
developing countries. The high status of human rights instruments such as the ICESCR 
and the specificity achieved by the CESCR provide developing states with an 
“interpretative basis ... that is missing in simple policy arguments about social 
concerns”.141 Human rights standards provide specific limitations on what is negotiable, 
while identifying precise minimum conditions that are beyond negotiation. They provide 
“a solid normative basis for values and policy choices which otherwise are more readily 
negotiable”.142  
 There are also practical benefits in identifying binding human rights standards. When 
values are established as binding norms they acquire important symbolic power.143 
Liberal democratic governments are usually motivated to obey the law or appear to be 
law-abiding.144 Members of civil society expect their governments to meet their 
international obligations.145 Conduct in violation of human rights might provoke moral 
outrage, but non-compliance with a binding rule of international law “carries its own, 
additional stigma, undermining the capacity of violators to defend their conduct, while 
enhancing the force of condemnation”.146 Faced with a well-developed human rights-
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based case, liberal administrations will be obliged to account for their actions and, in 
most cases, will also feel obliged to meet their obligations.147  
 For human rights standards to have practical effect in international forums they must 
become “internalized”148 by the governments involved. Norm internalisation is achieved 
when norms are repeatedly raised and discussed in negotiation until eventually they 
acquire their “stickiness”.149 Developing countries could promote internalisation of 
ICESCR norms by repeatedly relying on them during negotiations. 
  Norm internalisation can also be promoted by activities of other actors such as 
international organisations, NGOs and human rights experts in the legal and academic 
communities, who can explore and publicise the human rights implications of IP 
protection.150  This leads to human rights consciousness-raising among the general 
public (who can put pressure on their governments) as well as within governments 
directly.151 
 A weaker version of the human rights argument does not rely on international human 
rights as legally binding rules but examines their potential value as soft-law norms. This 
approach is particularly useful when considering the position of the United States, which 
has not yet ratified the ICESCR but is a signatory to the Convention as well as to the non-
binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights,152 which also protects the right to 
health.153  
 The soft-law approach argues that even if the human rights norms are not binding, 
they nevertheless provide useful benchmarks for examination. They provide a credible 
foundation for critical consideration of the interests of users of patented products and of 
public welfare more broadly.  Developing states raising such concerns would not merely 
be stating unilateral preferences; rather, they would be urging the global community to 
abide by international human rights standards that are almost universally accepted.154  
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Considered in this way, human rights can be used to generate “counterregime norms” 
which provide alternative ways of looking at the treaty norms developed in the WTO155 
and challenge the hegemony of the idea that IP protection can be championed with little 
regard to the possible effects on the public interest.156 The political impact of soft-law 
norms should not be underestimated.157  
 Human rights are also useful for framing positive agendas.158 UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Mary Robinson notes that all decision-makers should “draw upon 
human rights standards in ways that will help to improve the transparency and 
accountability and quality of their decisions”.159 Taking human rights into account may 
suggest additional indicators for examination, may assist in choosing among policy 
options, and will focus attention on the potential outcomes of proposed policies and 
programmes.160 
 
5 THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  
The WIPO Development Agenda discussions respond to attempts within WIPO to limit 
patent policy flexibility through a new Substantive Patent Law Treaty.161 However, they 
also respond more generally to protectionist trends in international IP law evident in 
TRIPS and in bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
 The WIPO Development Agenda can be understood as an attempt by developing 
countries to move the IP discussion beyond the internal balance and welfare-enhancing 
discussions that had proved so frustrating at Doha. The Development Agenda proposals 
broaden the discussion to include wider development concerns and refer to documents 
that were drafted outside of the WTO and WIPO,162 including high status international 
documents such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).163 
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 However, the Development Agenda process has also become mired in “internal” IP 
debates, as will be discussed below. 
 
5.1 The Development Agenda Proposals 
The Development Agenda discussions were based on documents put forward by a 
coalition of developing countries in 2004164 and 2005.165 Many of the concerns expressed 
by “The Group of Friends of Development” (GFD)166 involve the internal workings of the 
WIPO staff and secretariat. This article, however, focuses on the GFD proposals that 
concern intellectual property norm-setting more broadly. 
 To some extent the Development Agenda documents are based on the familiar “balance 
and welfare-enhancing” arguments that were largely ineffective at Doha. The GFD points 
out that “intellectual property protection is not an end in itself, but rather a means to 
support public policy objectives such as economic, social, and cultural well-being”167 and 
stresses that the social costs of monopoly protection must always be balanced against 
the likely benefits.168 In this regard the GFD emphasises the need for operable public 
interest flexibilities in international IP agreements169 so that states have enough IP policy 
space to promote domestic policy goals.170 
 However, the GFD also makes some new arguments. These highlight “development” as 
the “most important challenge facing the international community,”171 and argue that 
“the development dimension” should be integrated into all WIPO’s activities.172 The GFD 
documents express concern about the uncritical approach to IP protection endorsed by 
some developed states.  This uncritical perspective tends to approach intellectual 
property protection “as if it were governed by absolute truths”.173 These “absolute truths” 
include the assumption that “development” is an automatic consequence of strengthening 
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intellectual property rights174 and that “higher protection levels are always and 
inherently beneficial in promoting development and innovation”.175  
 The GFD documents point out that the impact of IP protection varies in different 
economic and social contexts and that it is very unlikely that IP standards deemed 
appropriate to developed economies will have the same effect in developing and least-
developed states. Indeed, it is possible that they will impede development.176  They also 
demand a critical examination of the impact of proposed levels of protection on “the 
public interest, innovation and access to science, technology and the promotion of 
diverse national creative industries – in order to ensure material progress and welfare in 
the long run”.177 
 
5.2 Examining “absolute truths”: Do stronger patents promote innovation 
and development? 
If patent monopolies encourage innovation, one might assume that more stringent and 
powerful patents will encourage more innovation. Economists, however, know that the 
link between patent strength and innovation is much more complicated. This is because 
almost all innovation is cumulative.178 Those engaged in new research build on the work 
of their predecessors and often need access to use research tools (for example, gene 
fragments) which are still under patent. 
 This dynamic affects pharmaceutical research particularly. Modern biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research relies on the use of genes, proteins and other gene 
fragments.179 Often, these essential research tools are under patent. This has created 
significant difficulty for scientists. Many scientists have reported that important research 
has been impeded by, for example, gene patenting.180 Problems arise when patent holders 
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refuse to issue research licences, charge exorbitant prices or impose licensing conditions 
which restrict publication of research results or limit collaboration within the scientific 
community.181 Very often a project requires the use of many protected products and 
becomes mired in a logistical nightmare of patent negotiation;182 at worst, projects 
become financially impossible.183 These problems are particularly evident in developing 
countries, where scientists are comparatively under-resourced,184 and for those 
researching “unprofitable diseases” like malaria and tuberculosis which primarily affect 
poor people.185  
 Hundreds of economic studies have investigated the relationship between patent 
strength and the promotion of innovation.186 These studies show that there is a delicate, 
complex, and largely unpredictable relationship between patenting and innovation.187 
Economists have been unable to identify the precise level at which patent strength 
becomes a barrier rather than an incentive. Most agree, however, that strengthening 
patent protection does not always promote innovation and that there is a point at which 
it tends to have the opposite effect.188 Economists also agree that patent strength will 
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have different impacts in different industries and in different economic contexts.189 It is 
impossible to develop a general model or template of “ideal protection levels” for any 
industry in any country. 
 Developed states have also consistently argued that if developing countries raise their 
levels of IP protection, they will attract foreign direct investment and technology transfer 
and will stimulate local innovation.190 However, in-depth theoretical economic analyses 
as well as consideration of empirical data tend to suggest that, while raising intellectual 
property standards has had demonstrably negative effects on public welfare in developing 
countries,191 it has not attracted the promised investment and technology transfer192 and 
seldom seems to increase levels of local innovation.193 Indeed, raised IP protection levels 
often have negative impacts on local innovation in developing states because many of the 
research inputs, upon which follow-on research is based, are subject to IP restrictions 
that make them unaffordable in these economies.194 
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5.3 Internal arguments at the Development Agenda discussions 
One of the most notable features of the Development Agenda discussions195 was the 
apparent consensus among all parties – both developed states and the GFD – on the 
“importance of development”. What was also notable, however, was that no-one ever 
defined “development” explicitly – perhaps deliberately.196  A look at the priorities 
identified by each group and the policies they advocated, however, suggests that they had 
in mind somewhat different conceptions of development. Developed countries appeared 
to view macroeconomic development as the end goal.197 Their focus was on growing the 
economy generally by promoting local innovation and expanding international trade.198 
Their arguments were consistently based on the assumption that intellectual property 
protection fostered innovation and technological development and that strengthening 
this protection would further promote these processes.199  
 From this perspective, increasing the levels of IP protection is an inherently pro-
development activity. The United States, for example, stressed “the important role that 
intellectual property protection played in fostering economic development”, noted that 
WIPO’s mission was “to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the 
world”, and concluded that “because strong intellectual property protection [is] a 
fundamental part of any nation’s sound economic policies, by its very nature, WIPO’s 
mission, as currently elaborated, promoted economic development”.200 
 As outlined above, however, it is far from clear that strengthening patent protection in 
developing countries will promote local innovation or technological development.  This 
point was made repeatedly by developing states during the discussions. In particular, 
developing countries noted that inflexible IP protection at too high a level was likely to 
impede innovation in developing states rather than promote it.201 In this regard, a 
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number of developing countries specifically noted the importance of access to patented 
research tools in the development of local science and technology sectors and in the 
development of therapies for neglected diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis.202 
 Although developing countries repeatedly stressed these points, the developed states 
clung fast to their “absolute truth”203 that increased IP protection levels lead to 
development.  During the April 2005 session, for example, the United States delegation 
“welcomed the opportunity” to discuss “the important role intellectual property played in 
fostering economic, social and cultural development”.204 The US delegation believed that 
development was “one of the most important challenges facing the international 
community” and that “intellectual property protection played a key and positive role in 
development”.205  
 Because they believed that protecting intellectual property is essential for promoting 
development, developed countries believed that WIPO already had a development agenda 
to be found precisely in its “contribution to the development of intellectual property”206 
and its efforts to ensure better and stronger intellectual property protection. Stronger and 
better intellectual property protection would itself promote “development of individuals 
and societies all across the globe”.207   
 The GFD demonstrated an entirely different understanding of development. From their 
perspective, development was something more than technological development, 
expansion of trade or macroeconomic growth. They stressed the importance of 
improvements in health, public welfare, nutrition and education, demonstrating an 
understanding of development as having an important human dimension. Its goal is 
improving the quality of life for everyone.208 
 While developing states did not expressly link their assertions to the development 
economics advanced by theorists such as Amartya Sen, their understanding of 
development can be broadly understood within Sen’s framework “as a process of 
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy … [which include] the freedom to satisfy 
hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses”.209  
For Sen, development is ultimately about the freedom to choose to live a worthwhile life.  
He has called this the “capabilities approach”.  “Human capabilities” refer to the “ability of 
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human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance the substantive 
choices they have”.210 A person’s ability and freedom to make these choices is enhanced 
when he or she is “healthy, well-nourished and educated”.211 
 The GFD referred consistently to health, nutrition, education and other aspects of 
development that enhance human capabilities and freedom.212 They emphasised the 
ways in which the international IP system prevents many people from accessing goods 
(such as pharmaceuticals) which have a direct bearing on their quality of life. For the 
GFD it is not enough that patents may encourage innovation; they stressed the 
importance of disseminating new inventions so that more people can enjoy their 
benefits.213  
 No doubt, the United States and other developed countries agree that everyone should 
be fed, educated, and given medical treatment. In the WIPO Development discussions, 
however, they seemed to assume that these are probable by-products of the technological 
and macroeconomic growth that an intellectual property system will foster, rather than 
immediate goals of the system itself. They argued that higher levels of intellectual 
property protection would increase innovation and that economic growth would 
follow.214  Their emphasis was on the ways in which the intellectual property system 
encourages the development of pharmaceutical, agricultural and other innovations, not 
on whether everyone is actually able to gain access to them. 
 Thus the consensus on “the importance of development” was ultimately something of 
an illusion. The parties were not really talking about the same thing. This was never 
spelled out. They did not debate their understandings of “development” but merely talked 
past one another, never engaging critically and pretending not to notice.215  
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 Although the GFD may have intended its appeal to a “development dimension” as an 
“external argument” (particularly in light of explicit reference to the MDGs and other 
external documents), the goal of development is not external to the intellectual property 
regime or to the patent system: the public goods (medicines, food, education) that the 
GFD referred to in their conception of “development” have always been the intended 
products of the intellectual property system.216 In addition, “development”, understood as 
macroeconomic growth, is a core goal of the intellectual property system for the 
developed states. Thus, in practice, the appeal to “development” was yet another “internal 
argument”, easily co-opted by developed states which continued to present their own 
“internal” development arguments, allowing the discussions to go round in circles for 
years. 
 An explicit human rights-based approach, linked to precise and binding norms, could 
have helped focus developing states’ demands and might have prevented this kind of 
circular non-engagement by pointing to clear, absolute, and non-negotiable bottom lines, 
less vulnerable to this kind of high-level and theoretical non-discussion. 
 For example, the developing states could have relied on the clear and well-developed 
benchmarks for the right to health. The Development Agenda discussions were about 
“development”; the UN Secretary General has described the HIV/AIDS pandemic as “our 
biggest development challenge”.217  In Africa, HIV/AIDS has been cited as both a result 
and a cause of endemic poverty.218 AIDS deaths are concentrated among adults of 
working age, potentially crippling the productive capacity of the economy and affecting 
states’ capacity for economic development and technological innovation.219 Illness affects 
the productivity of businesses and manufacturing plants; among farm workers it lowers 
agricultural output and threatens food security.220 School enrolments drop significantly, 
which affects the future productive capabilities of the children and of the economy 
generally.221 The scale of the epidemic places enormous strain on health and welfare 
services, diverting funds from alternative development projects.222 The WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has concluded that “[t]he AIDS pandemic 
represents a unique challenge of unprecedented urgency and intensity. This single 
epidemic can undermine Africa’s development over the next generation … unless 
addressed by greatly increased efforts”.223 
                                                   
216 See the discussion on welfare enhancing narratives above. 
217 As quoted in Walker (fn 6 above) para 45. 
218 Jeffrey Sachs The end of poverty: how we can make it happen in our lifetime Penguin (2005) at 204; Alan 
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para 45. 
222 Helen Watchirs “A human rights approach to HIV/AIDS: transforming international obligations into 
national law” (2002) 22 Australian Yearbook of International Law 77 at 80-81; Sisule Musungu “The 
TRIPS Agreement and public health provisions” in Correa & Yusuf (eds) Intellectual property and 
international trade: the TRIPS Agreement  2 ed. Wolters-Kluwer (2008) 421 at 424. 
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 States urgently need access to affordable antiretroviral medicine to control the 
pandemic.224 The link between HIV/AIDS, development and essential medicines is clear. 
And the link between essential medicines, intellectual property and human rights has 
also now been clearly set out by the CESCR. Furthermore, development of new essential 
medicines to combat other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis may be impeded by 
patenting of upstream research, also identified as a violation of the right to health. 
 If the developing countries had highlighted the HIV/AIDS pandemic as an urgent 
development concern, explained how patenting standards may impede the availability of 
essential medicines and raised the CESCR’s human rights benchmarks, they would have 
focused the Development Agenda discussions on some of the specific ways in which IP 
promotes or impedes development, and could have suggested some practical (and 
perhaps legally required) solutions to current difficulties. 
 
6 MOVING FORWARD: WORKING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
The Development Agenda was finally adopted in September 2007.  The 45 agreed 
Recommendations call for a new approach to intellectual property: IP protection should 
be considered “in the context of broader societal interests and especially development-
oriented concerns” in accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which is quoted 
in full.225 
 The cluster of Recommendations most relevant to this paper’s concern with policy 
flexibility is Cluster B on “norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and the public 
domain”.226 Recommendation 15 provides the following:  
“Norm-setting activities shall: 
 be inclusive and member-driven; 
 take into account different levels of development; 
 take into consideration a balance between costs and benefits; 
 be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests and 
priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other stakeholders, 
including accredited inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and NGOs; and 
 be in line with the principle of neutrality of the WIPO Secretariat.”227 
These are extremely important recommendations, but lack specificity. There are no clear 
guidelines or benchmarks to assess whether intellectual property norm-setting achieves 
“a balance between costs and benefits”228 or what it means to “take into account different 
levels of development”.  There are no clear bottom lines to resolve the cost-benefit tension 
inherent in the intellectual property system. Indeed, it is not clear either that the 
Recommendations offer any more guidance than TRIPS’s existing flexibilities, or that they 
                                                   
224 CIPR (fn 40 above); WHO (fn 112 above)  para 17; DFID (fn 36 above) ; WHO (fn 41 above) at  238; 
Médecins sans Frontières (fn 112 above). 
225 Recommendation 45.  
226 Recommendations 15-23. 
227 Recommendation 15. 
228 Recommendation 15. 




will avert the circular debate that characterised the WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions and the Doha talks.  
 The closest the Recommendations come to providing a firm and non-negotiable 
bottom line is Recommendation 22, which provides that “WIPO’s norm-setting activities 
should be supportive of the development goals agreed within the United Nations System, 
including those contained in the Millennium Development Goals”.229  
 The MDGs provide a list of universally-agreed230 priorities which, in terms of 
Recommendation 22, intellectual property rules should promote rather than obstruct. 
The Goals provide possible benchmarks against which proposed IP treaties can be 
assessed. For example, promotion of MDG 6 to “[a]chieve, by 2010, universal access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it”231 might suggest that states should 
have enough patent policy flexibility to establish pharmaceutical strategies which include 
generic medicines. However, MDG 8, to the effect that states should “[i]n cooperation 
with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in 
developing countries”,232 could undermine this conclusion by suggesting that the goal of 
universal access might be achieved through voluntary donations or discounts from 
pharmaceutical companies or through developing states’ increased buying-power 
resulting from other parts of MDG 8 such as grants, debt relief and enhanced export 
opportunities.233 These are precisely the types of solutions that developed states have 
previously preferred to more flexible IP rules.234 
 It appears that the MDGs are not specific enough to “counter” the detailed rules in 
TRIPS: they do not mandate clear routes to their achievement and are open to a variety of 
interpretations. Human rights norms provide many advantages over the policy references 
in the MDGs or the Development Agenda more broadly. In contrast to policy references, 
as noted already, human rights standards provide “specific limitations on what is 
negotiable, and lay down precise minimum conditions which are beyond negotiation”.235 
 However, the MDGs and the broader reference to “development goals agreed within 
the United Nations System” could yet be used to introduce an explicit human rights focus 
to IP discussions. It is a question of how UN development goals are interpreted.236 In 
recent years the United Nations has adopted an explicitly “rights-based approach to 
development”, defined as “a conceptual framework for the process of human development 
that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally 
directed to promoting and protecting human rights”.237 There are many benefits to 
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linking “development” to the norms set out in international human rights documents; key 
among them is that human rights norms are specific, measurable, often binding, and 
have already been formally adopted by most states. Furthermore, the human rights 
system focuses attention on the needs of the poor, thus promoting an understanding of 
“development” which is directed at improving the quality of life for everyone and at 
increasing human capabilities and freedom. 
 Since the adoption of the Development Agenda, human rights agencies within the 
United Nations have offered to assist WIPO in the interpretation of the “development 
orientated” norm-setting referred to in the Agenda. The UN Working Group on the Right 
to Development, for example, has met with WIPO to highlight the importance of ensuring 
that intellectual property rules are human rights-compliant and that Development 
Agenda work is informed by a human rights approach.238  
 If states want to move their discussion forward in a meaningful way they should 
examine the contributions made by human rights bodies such as the CESCR and the 
Working Group on the Right to Development. The human rights system offers standards 
and benchmarks that give legal content to the term “public benefit”, against which the 
social costs of the intellectual property system can be assessed. Unlike the intellectual 
property system, the human rights system provides objective bottom lines.  
 The WIPO Development Agenda does not in itself offer any new guidelines or 
benchmarks that provide a “paradigm shift”239 for future discussions. However, the 
human rights community is willing to assist with interpretation of the Agenda document 
(and the UN development goals to which it refers), so as to insert human rights norms 
into the conversation. All WIPO states should take advantage of this opportunity so that 
intellectual property can indeed become a constructive tool for the betterment of human 
existence.240 
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